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ABSTRACT
This case commentary examines the CJEU’s recent decision in C-621/15 W and Others v
Sanoﬁ PasteurMSD SNC [2017] ECR I. This commentary critically examines the decision
through the lens of the cultural conﬂict between law and science. We argue that the
CJEU’s decision reﬂects both a distortion of scientiﬁc knowledge and an improper indiffer-
ence to the legitimate methods by which scientiﬁc knowledge is generated in the context
of vaccines. These judicial approaches may, the authors argue, inadvertently fuel the vac-
cine scepticism that is growing across the developed world, and in particular in Europe.
KEYWORDS: CJEU, Hepatitis B, Multiple Sclerosis, Products liability, Tort, Vaccines.
INTRODUCTION
Vaccines are biological pharmaceuticals that produce or improve immunity against a
speciﬁc disease. Vaccines contain bacteria or viruses that are known to cause a particu-
lar infection, such as Hepatitis B and, once administered, work by imitating the rele-
vant infection without causing illness to the individual. This allows the individual’s
immune system to develop the same response as it would if they were naturally in-
fected with the infection; thereby priming their immune system to ﬁght the infection.
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Vaccines are vital public health tools as the beneﬁcial effects of them are not just felt
by the individual receiving the vaccine, but by those in the wider community too,
through herd immunity.1
As vaccines are typically administered to healthy individuals, and have the possibility
to cause harm through adverse events, various legal frameworks control their develop-
ment, licensing, and regulation. Vaccine development involves multiple stages (including
pre-clinical trials and phased clinical trials),2 all of which primarily focus on the ability of
the vaccine manufacturer to demonstrate that the vaccine is safe and efﬁcacious.3 If clini-
cal trials do prove (to the required level of scientiﬁc certainty) that a vaccine can prevent
disease, and that vaccine is subsequently administered to the wider public, ongoing mon-
itoring will occur through pharmacovigilance activities.4 In France, the jurisdiction from
which C-621/15 was referred, this is undertaken by ‘Agence nationale de securitedu me
dicament et des produits de sante’(ANSM) during clinical trials.5 Pharmacovigilance pro-
vides ‘strict safety supervision’ of vaccines by detecting, assessing, understanding, prevent-
ing, and communicating any adverse events that follow immunisation.6 An ‘adverse
event’ refers to harm caused by a vaccine beyond ‘normal’ side effects.7
When an ‘adverse event’ occurs, the science underpinning vaccines may eventually
intersect with the law in the context of the tort of products liability. In such instances,
an individual subject to the adverse event (or their next of kin) may seek compensa-
tion for the harm sustained from the producer of the vaccine. In order to receive com-
pensation, the claimant will need to satisfy relevant legal rules related to that tort.8
For Member States of the European Union, Article 4 of Directive 85/374 (‘the
Directive’) provides for producer liability where a product is deemed ‘defective’, pro-
viding the injured person can prove ‘the damage, the defect and the causal relationship
between the defect and damage’.9 It is in this context that C-621/15 arose. In C-621/
15 France sought clariﬁcation from the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) about how to, in accordance with the Directive, approach an alleged causal
relationship between the Hepatitis B vaccine and the onset of multiple sclerosis
1 CE Gordon Smith,‘Prospects for the Control of Infectious Disease’(1970) 63(11) Proc R Soc Med 1181;
JP Fox and others, ‘Herd Immunity: Basic Concept and Relevance to Public Health Immunization
Practicess, (1971) 94(3) Am J Epidemiol 179; P Fine, ‘Herd Immunity: History, Theory, Practice’ (1993)
15(2) Epidemiol Rev 265; DL Heymann and RB Alyward, ‘Mass Vaccination in Public Health’ in DL
Heymann (ed), Control of Communicable Diseases Manual (19th edn, American Public Health Association
2008).
2 ME Halloran, IM Longini and CJ Struchiner, Design and Analysis of Vaccine Studies (Springer 2010).
3 ibid.
4 World Health Organization, The Importance of Pharmacovigilance (WHO 2002) <http://apps.who.int/
iris/bitstream/10665/42493/1/a75646.pdf> accessed May September 2017.
5 P Peretti-Watel and others, ‘Vaccine Hesitancy: Clarifying a Theoretical Framework for an Ambiguous
Notion’ (2015) 25(7) PLoS Curr, DOI: 10.1371/currents.outbreaks.6844c80ff9f5b273f34c91f71b7fc289.
6 World Health Organization (n 4).
7 ibid 40.
8 This varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For comparison the US system of product liability related to
vaccines operates as a no-fault liability scheme. For more information see KM Cook and G Evans, ‘The
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program’ (2011) 4 Paediatrics 146.
9 Directive 85/374 93/104 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of
the Member States concerning liability for defective products [1985] 85/374/EEC (OJ L 201, 7.8.1985
pp. 29–33) (Products Liability Directive).
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(MS); compelling the CJEU to consider the science underpinning the vaccine within
its system of legal rules and ideals.
This comment examines the CJEU’s decision in C-621/15. Section ‘Case history’
provides a case history including the history of legal claims, questions referred to the
CJEU and the associated ﬁndings of that court. Section ‘Critical discussion’ critically
examines the CJEU’s decision through the lens that this case is, in the authors’ view, a
compelling example of the cultural conﬂicts that beset the institutions of law and sci-
ence when they intersect in this way. Speciﬁcally, the authors argue the CJEU’s deci-
sion that reﬂects both a distortion of scientiﬁc knowledge (particularly about the
alleged causal relationship between Hepatitis B vaccine and the onset of MS), and an
improper indifference to the legitimate methods by which scientiﬁc knowledge is gen-
erated in the context of vaccines. These judicial approaches may, the authors argue, in-
advertently (but no less worryingly) fuel the vaccine scepticism that is growing across
the developed world, and in particular in Europe.
CASE HISTORY
C-621/15 arose from events concerning a ‘Mr W’ in France. Mr W was vaccinated
against Hepatitis B through the administration of three separate injections following a
mass vaccination campaign in France.10 Sanoﬁ Pasteur (Sanoﬁ) manufactured the
three doses that Mr W received, the last of which was administered on 8July 1999.11
In August 1999, Mr W ‘began to present with various troubles.’12 In November 2000,
15 months after receiving his ﬁrst Hepatitis B vaccination,13 he was diagnosed with
MS.14 His health worsened to the point that he required constant care, and he died
on 30 October 2011.15 Prior to his death, Mr W and three family members instigated
legal proceedings against Sanoﬁ arguing the Hepatitis B vaccine was defective and
there was a causal relationship between the vaccine and the onset of Mr W’s MS.
History of Legal Claims
The initial action and ﬁrst appeal
In 2006, Mr W brought an action, relying on Article 136-1 (now Article 1245-8) of
the French Civil Code, arguing that Sanoﬁ should compensate them for the ‘damage’
caused to Mr W as a result of him being administered the Hepatitis B vaccine.16 They
claimed two particular facts gave rise to ‘serious, speciﬁc and consistent presumptions’
as to the vaccine being defective and there being a causal relationship between the
Hepatitis B vaccine and Mr W’s onset of MS. These facts were the (i) ‘short period
between the vaccination and the appearance of the ﬁrst symptom of multiple
10 MA Balinska, ‘Hepatitis B Vaccination and French Society Ten Years after the Suspension of the
Vaccination Campaign: How Should We Raise Infant Immunization Coverage Rates?’ (2009) 46 J Clin
Virol 202; F Denis and D Levy-Bruhl, Mass Vaccination Against Hepatitis B: The French Example (Springer
2006).
11 C-621/15W and Others v Sanoﬁ Pasteur MSD SNC [2017] ECR I – 1 484, para 9.
12 ibid.
13 ibid.
14 ibid.
15 ibid, para 10.
16 ibid.
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sclerosis’; and (ii) ‘lack of any personal or family history of the disease’.17 A decision
from the Cour de Cassation (French Court of Causation) provided that a court ruling
on the merits may consider such facts when determining a ‘defect’ and causal relation-
ship.18 This was the case regardless of whether ‘medical research establishe[s] a rela-
tionship between the vaccine and the occurrence of the disease’.19 This action was
upheld at ﬁrst instance by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Nanterre (Regional Court,
Nanterre, France) on 4 September 2009. Sanoﬁ appealed to the Cour d’ appel de
Versailles (Court of Appeal, Versailles), who overturned the decision on 10 February
2011, ﬁnding the presumptions were capable of providing a causal relationship, but
not a defect in the vaccine.20
The second and third appeals
W appealed to the Cour de Cassation, who found in his favour on 26 September
2012. The Court found that ‘general considerations’, such as the ‘cost/beneﬁt ratio of
the vaccination;’ Mr W’s excellent health prevaccination; the lack of ‘family anteced-
ents’ with regards to MS; and the close temporal proximity between the vaccinations
and onset of MS, meant serious, speciﬁc, and consistent presumptions supporting the
conclusion that there was causal link between the Hepatitis Vaccine, and onset of MS
was sufﬁciently established.21 This was the case without examining whether the same
presumptions were sufﬁcient to show ‘defect’ too.22
Sanoﬁ appealed the decision to the Cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris,
France), who overturned the judgment of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de
Nanterre. In so ruling, the court made a number of observations. First, that there was
no ‘scientiﬁc consensus’ supporting a ‘causal relationship between the vaccination
against Hepatitis B and multiple sclerosis’.23 Speciﬁcally, the court noted, all the ‘na-
tional and international health authorities’ had rejected the association between a like-
lihood of being affected by certain characteristics of MS and the Hepatitis B vaccine.24
Secondly, the court stated that multiple medical studies show the aetiology of MS is
currently ‘unknown’.25 Thirdly, a recent medical publication concluded that, at the
time when the ‘ﬁrst symptoms of multiple sclerosis appear, the pathophysiological
process probably commenced many months or many years earlier’.26 Fourthly, epide-
miological studies show that ‘92 to 95%’ of persons suffering from MS had no family
history of the disease.27 On the basis of these observations, the court concluded the
factors relied upon by W could not ‘together or separately’ establish serious, speciﬁc,
and consistent presumptions that there was a causal relationship between the
Hepatitis B vaccine and the onset of W’s MS.
17 ibid, para 11.
18 ibid, para 13.
19 ibid.
20 ibid, para 14.
21 ibid, para 15.
22 ibid.
23 ibid, para 16.
24 ibid.
25 ibid.
26 ibid.
27 ibid.
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Referral to the CJEU
W appealed against the ruling of the Cour d’appel de Paris. The Cour de Cassation
stayed proceedings and referred three questions to the CJEU for preliminary ruling.
In summary, these questions were:
(i) In the context of pharmaceutical vaccine manufacturer liability, does the
Directive prevent a court from relying upon the evidence presented by W
when determining liability (ie what constitutes ‘serious, speciﬁc and consistent
presumptions’ to show a defect and causal relationship), notwithstanding that
medical research does not establish a ‘causal relationship’ between a vaccine
and the injury (ie there is no scientiﬁc consensus)?
(ii) Does the Directive prevent Member States from creating a system of ‘pre-
sumptions’ with respect to vaccine injuries, where, if certain ‘indications of
causation’ are found, liability always follows (regardless of ‘scientiﬁc
consensus’)?
(iii) Does the Directive require that a victim must adduce evidence that a ‘causal
relationship’ between the vaccine and the injury is scientiﬁcally established (ie
there is a scientiﬁc consensus as to causation)?28
Findings of the CJEU
The CJEU made rulings in respect of questions one and two, and found it unneces-
sary to consider the third. The CJEU’s ﬁndings are summarised below.
Question 1
The court determined that the Directive does not prevent the use of evidence—such
as that presented by W—for establishing a casual relationship between a vaccine and
the onset of harm. In the absence of legislation dictating what evidence should be ad-
duced,29 Member States should determine ‘how the evidence is to be elicited’.30
Member States must ensure that the evidence adduced in sufﬁciently serious, speciﬁc,
and consistent to warrant the conclusion that a defect is the most plausible explana-
tion for the relevant damage, ‘with the result that the defect and the casual link may
reasonably be considered established’.31 Ultimately, national courts can use evidence
concerning temporal proximity between the administering of a vaccine and the occur-
rence of a disease; the lack of personal and familial history of that disease; and a ‘sig-
niﬁcant number of reported cases of the disease occurring following such vaccines
being administered’ to enable the victim to satisfy ‘his burden of proof under Article 4
of Directive 85/374’.32
The court stated that ‘medical research neither conﬁrms nor rules out a link be-
tween’33 the administration of the Hepatitis B vaccine and the on-set of MS (which
28 ibid, para 17.
29 ibid, para 24.
30 ibid, para 25.
31 ibid, para 37.
32 ibid, para 41.
33 ibid, para 30.
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we return to below). As a consequence of this, they stated that evidentiary rules that,
ﬁrst, prevent the claimant from using ‘circumstantial evidence’34 and, second, require
certain evidence based on medical research in order for the victim to be able to dis-
charge the burden of proof35 would be contrary to the ‘effectiveness’ of the
Directive.36
Question 2
The court ruled that Member States could not legislate to create their own systems of
‘pre-determined relevant evidence’37 that would—in effect—establish automatic pre-
sumptions of a causal link between a vaccine defect and the onset of injury. To do
so—the court observed—would undermine Article 4 of the Directive.38 In particular,
the court found such systems would deprive vaccine manufacturers of the chance to
put forward ‘scientiﬁc arguments’ to ‘rebut’ those presumptions.39 Naturally, this
would also mean a causal link is established before a court ruling on the merits of a
case had the opportunity to consider the producer’s evidence and arguments.40
Question 3
The CJEU did not consider question 3 because in light of its ruling on question 1, a
causal link need not always be ‘scientiﬁcally established’.
CRITICAL DISCUSSION
The judgment of the CJEU in C-621/15 raises questions about how scientiﬁc knowl-
edge is approached by the judicial process. In this context the authors have identiﬁed
a number of issues for discussion. First however, we must address the general conﬂict
between law and science, which C-621/15 highlights in the speciﬁc context of judicial
engagement with products of science (vaccines) and the scientiﬁc method underpin-
ning those products.
Generally, science assists law to understand the world in which legal policy must
operate:41 shaping legal frameworks that govern society in various areas including the
development, licensing, and regulation of medical products, such as vaccines. In so do-
ing, science helps law to tackle complex societal challenges such as the regulation of
public health. In many ways C-621/15 is a classic intersection of law and science,
namely the judiciary being asked to determine the legal response for when a product
of science, namely a vaccine, has allegedly caused an adverse event. Such cases logi-
cally require the judiciary to confront scientiﬁc evidence as part of the decision-mak-
ing process. In such instances, it is natural for conﬂict or inconsistencies to emerge.
This is primarily because law and science approach the world in different ways.
34 ibid.
35 ibid.
36 ibid, para 31.
37 ibid, para 47.
38 ibid, para 52.
39 ibid, para 53.
40 ibid.
41 DL Faigman, Legal Alchemy: The Use and Misuse of Science in the Law (Henry Holt & Co 2000) Faigman ar-
gues that ‘without [science], legal policy is literally blinded’, 6.
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First, science cannot yield the levels of certainty that the legal process often be-
lieves it can. This is because science employs a method that is circular in nature, and,
therefore, tends to be naturally progressive and forward-thinking.42 This stands in
stark contrast to the judicial process, which, through its reliance on precedent,43 for
example, is inherently inclined to look back and tie itself to the past.44 Secondly, sci-
ence tends to produce provisional products of knowledge (or rather, dominant theo-
ries), whereas the judicial process demands ﬁnality and deﬁnite answers in order to
resolve disputes while maintaining the efﬁcacy of its processes and outcomes.45
Thirdly, the standards by which science and the judiciary will be persuaded of the
‘truthfulness’ of a claim differ: law imposes speciﬁc standards of proof that can be pro-
ven in a variation of ways depending on the case at hand, whereas science, especially
in the context of a pharmaceutical product like vaccines, has rigid frameworks that
must be adhered to in order for an approximation of ‘truth’ to be considered valid.46
Institutions that have competence to address the intersection of law and science in
the context of vaccines, such as the CJEU in C-621/15, must be mindful to not exac-
erbate these tensions through their decision-making, to the detriment of what science
perceives truth to be—ie the relevant dominant theory. In the authors’ view C-621/
15 showcases the judiciary doing just that. We make three observations in support of
our viewpoint.
Our ﬁrst point relates to how the CJEU describes competing scientiﬁc evidence. In
C-621/15, the court states that ‘medical research neither conﬁrms nor rules out a link
between’47 the administration of the Hepatitis B vaccine and the onset of MS. Here,
the court is seemingly making an observation about the general, current clinical evi-
dence landscape that has investigated an alleged link between the Hepatitis B vaccine
and the onset of MS. In our view, the court’s phrasing distorts the current scientiﬁc
consensus produced through this body of research. The court’s language suggests it
views the research as being equally weighted about whether there is a link between
the Hepatitis B vaccine and the onset of MS. At present, however, although a few
studies approximate a link,48 and others have produced inconclusive results,49 the vast
42 S Jasanoff, ‘Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the Legal Process’ (2006) 34 JL Med Ethics 328, 334.
43 Despite there not being a strict doctrine of precedent in EU law—the CJEU does appear to regard its previ-
ous decisions as being binding in some instances. See A Toth, ‘The Authority of Judgments of the
European Court of Justice: Binding Force and Legal Effects’ (1984) 4 YB Eur L 1; J Komarek, ‘Federal
Elements in the Community Judicial System: Building Coherence in the Community Legal Order’ (2005)
42 CMLR 9, 16.
44 SL Cooper, ‘Forensic Science Identiﬁcation Evidence: Tensions Between Law and Science’ (2016) 16(4) J
Philos Sci L 1, 9.
45 ibid 11 (‘. . . a strong ﬁdelity to ﬁnality, precedent, and consistency in judicial decision-making are the order
of legal business . . .’).
46 In the context of the EU see: European Medicines Agency, ‘Applying for EU Marketing Authorisation for
Medicinal Products for Human Use’ (EU 2015) <http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/docment_
library/Leaﬂet/2011/03/WC500104233.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2017).
47 C-621/15 (n 11), paras 18, 30, 31, 43, 44, 55, 57.
48 M Herna´n and others, ‘Recombinant Hepatitis B Vaccine and the Risk of Multiple Sclerosis a Prospective
Study’ (2004) Neurology 63(5), 838–42; D Le Houe´zec, ‘Evolution of Multiple Sclerosis in France Since
the Beginning of Hepatitis B Vaccination’ (2014) 60 Immunol Res 219.
49 E Touze´ and others, ‘Hepatitis B Vaccination And First Central Nervous System Demyelinating Event: a
Case-Control Study’ (2002) 21 Neuroepidemiol 180; A Langer-Gould and others, ‘Vaccines And the Risk
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majority of current research supports a dominant theory that there is no scientiﬁcally
valid link between the Hepatitis B vaccine and the onset of MS.50 Moreover, it is this
theory that international and national institutions focused on safeguarding healthcare
promulgate through their policies and guidelines.51 The CJEU’s approach to describ-
ing the research as neither conﬁrming nor ruling out a link in C-621/15 thus distorts
the scientiﬁc reality. This distortion is not, however, an uncommon eventuality of sci-
entiﬁc evidence being funnelled through legal processes, which can have the effect of
‘minimizing its [science’s] rigour, care and professionalism in the process’.52
This brings us to our second point: how the CJEU balances conﬂicting scientiﬁc
evidence. In C-621/15 the CJEU was presented with two conﬂicting sets of evidence.
The ﬁrst was that ‘all the national and international health authorities had rejected the
association between a likelihood of being affected by central or peripheral demyelinat-
ing disease (characteristic of MS) and the vaccination of Hepatitis B’.53 The second
body of evidence was based on the timing between the administration of the vaccine
and the onset of MS in Mr W, the lack of family history of MS in Mr W’s family, and
the existence of a ‘signiﬁcant number of reported cases of the disease occurring follow-
ing such vaccines being administered’.54 Ultimately, whichever set of evidence the
court felt most persuaded by would determine whether liability on the part of Sanoﬁ
could be established, such was the stark contrast between the competing sets of evi-
dence. The decision in C-621/15 implies that the court was more persuaded by the
second set of evidence, than the ﬁrst.
We ﬁnd this approach concerning because, while the CJEU is not entirely dismis-
sive of scientiﬁc evidence as a factor to be considered when determining the causal
link between the administration of a vaccine and the onset of an injury, the judgment
does present the court to be somewhat indifferent to the majority of scientiﬁc evi-
dence in this ﬁeld. More precisely, the court appears to be indifferent to the manner
in which the scientiﬁc evidence regarding the safety of the vaccine was created, and
the legitimacy the scientiﬁc method lends the results it creates.55 In concluding that
‘administering of the vaccine is the most plausible explanation for the occurrence of
the disease and, that the vaccine therefore does not offer the safety that one is entitled
to expect’56 the court placed a greater emphasis on the evidence related to the timing
of the vaccine, and family history, than on the large body of scientiﬁc evidence that
establishes there is no causal link between receiving a Hepatitis B vaccine, and the on-
set of MS. Our concern with the court’s approach to this evidence is not that the court
Of Multiple Sclerosis And Other Central Nervous System Demyelinating Diseases’ (2014) 71(12) JAMA
Neurol 1506.
50 For a systemic review of both randomised clinical trials and non-randomised studies addressing the correla-
tion between administration of a Hepatitis B vaccine and the onset of MS see F Farez and J Correale,
‘Immunizations And Risk of Multiple Sclerosis: Systematic Review And Meta-analysis’ (2011) 258 (7) J
Neurol 1197.
51 For example, World Health Organization, ‘The Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety Rejects
Association Between Hepatitis B Vaccination and Multiple Sclerosis (MS)’ (WHO 2002) <http://www.
who.int/vaccine_safety/committee/topics/hepatitisb/ms/en/> (accessed 4 September 2017).
52 Cooper (n 45) 8.
53 C-621/15 (n 11), para 16.
54 ibid, para 41.
55 For an outline of this process, see SA Plotkin,History of Vaccine Development (Springer 2011).
56 C-621/15 (n 11), para 41.
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took into account the second body of evidence relating to proximity but rather, that
the court presents that body of evidence as being equally convincing as the ﬁrst set of
evidence. Our point is that the body of relevant scientiﬁc evidence in this case should
have been given greater deference. Instead however, the court seemingly gave greater
deference to the circumstantial evidence presented.
We argue that the scientiﬁc evidence should have been given greater deference be-
cause of the method by which it was produced. The knowledge underpinning the po-
sition that there is no known association between a likelihood developing MS and the
administration of a Hepatitis B vaccine is a result of the application of the scientiﬁc
method to a particular hypothesis, ie ‘the administration of a Hepatitis B vaccine does
not cause multiple sclerosis’. This hypothesis is then tested against the data, though a
process of systematic process of observation and experimentation. The studies which
demonstrate no link between the administration of a Hepatitis B vaccine and the on-
set of MS have several thousand study participants.57 By contrast, the claim that the
administration of the vaccine did cause Mr W’s MS is informed largely by a temporal
correlation between administration and onset of the disease in the case study of Mr
W, as well as ‘signiﬁcant number of reported cases of the disease occurring following
such vaccines being administered’.58 In the case study of Mr W, as well as the ‘signiﬁ-
cant number of reported cases’, the individual sample size for each of these studies is
likely to be one. It is improper to reach a conclusion regarding the causal link between
the administration of a drug and an adverse event occurring on the basis of such small
sample sizes. Indeed, the authors acknowledge that the small sample size limits the
generalisability of these results.59 As Ankeney explains ‘Although cases are central to
the epistemic practices utilized [sic] within clinical medicine, they appear to be limited
in their ability to provide evidence about causal relations be- cause they provide de-
tailed accounts of particular patients without explicit ﬁltering of those attributes most
likely to be relevant for explaining the phenomena observed.’60
The CJEU’s approach to these competing bodies of evidence undermines the role
of science in the court process. However, such an approach is not altogether surpris-
ing, courts often struggle to accurately address conﬂict within science. This struggle
can be attributed to various factors, including that judges often lack scientiﬁc expertise,
and that legal frameworks and ideals do not easily reconcile with the scientiﬁc
method.61 At the centre of this case was a challenge to the dominant theory (pro-
duced by the scientiﬁc method) that there is no causal relationship between the ad-
ministration of a Hepatitis B vaccine, and the onset of MS. This is the generally
accepted position of the scientiﬁc community. Mr W challenged this dominant theory
57 A Ascherio and others, ‘Hepatitis B Vaccination and the Risk of Multiple Sclerosis’ (2001) 334 (5) NEJM
327–32; Y Mikaeloff and others, ‘Hepatitis B Vaccination and the Risk of Childhood-onset Multiple
Sclerosis’ (2007) 161(12) Arch Paediatr Adolesc Med 1176; AD Sadovnick and others, ‘School-based
Hepatitis B Vaccination Programme and Adolescent Multiple Sclerosis’ (2000) 355 (9203) Lancet 549.
58 C-621/15 (n 11), para 41.
59 L Herroelen and others, ‘Central-nervous-System Demyelination after Immunisation with Recombinant
Hepatitis B Vaccine’ (1991) 338 (8776) Lancet 1174.
60 RA Ankeny, ‘The Overlooked Role of Cases in Casual Attribution in Medicine’ (2014) 81 (5) Philos Sci
999.
61 Cooper (n 45).
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through producing circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence, such as this, is
insufﬁcient to persuade science to change a dominant theory, however, in C-621/15
this evidence did persuade the court to sideline the dominant theory. In so doing, the
CJEU injects legitimacy into the circumstantial evidence(s), absent there being a sci-
entiﬁcally robust reason for doing so. This is not an atypical legal approach to science,
however. As Jasanoff has explained, ‘the law accept[s] facts that science might still
deem provisional . . . Scientiﬁc facts needed to resolve legal disputes frequently come
into being only as those disputes unfold. They are not available before the fact in
some convenient storehouse of relevant, well-documented, yet case-speciﬁc facts’.62
In addition to this even when the CJEU does engage with the role of ‘science’ in
determining products liability claims in the context of vaccines—the CJEU undersells
the importance of science. In C-621/15 the CJEU rejects the implementation of sys-
tems that comprise irrefutable presumptions ie systems that automatically presume a
causal relationship exists when certain facts are established. The CJEU’s rejection is
based on a concern that,
such a presumption would have the consequence that, even where the pre-
identiﬁed facts are not, hypothetically, capable of establishing with certainty the
existence of such a causal link, the producer would, in such a case, be deprived
of all opportunity to adduce facts or put forward arguments, such as scientiﬁc ar-
guments, in order to rebut that presumption, and the court would thus not have
any opportunity to assess the facts in the light of that evidence or those
arguments.63
The CJEU’s comment agrees that science is relevant to disputes such as the instant,
and implicitly accepts that science may progress ie research may be produced to rule
out and/or establish causal relationships. We applaud the CJEU for singling out ‘sci-
entiﬁc arguments’ in determining this question. However, we also take the view that
the court should have been more direct regarding the role of science in determining
such issues ie made the weight of scientiﬁc consensus a key factor to be considered in
every such dispute.
Our ﬁnal point is that the CJEU’s overall approach in C-621/15 generally feeds
the growing vaccine scepticism in the developed world, particularly in France.
Immunisation is one of the most cost-effective health interventions available, prevent-
ing infection, disease, and disability around the world.64 Indeed, ‘during the second
half of the 20th century, vaccinations led to the control or even eradication of several
vaccine-preventable diseases in Europe. However, outbreaks of vaccine-preventable
diseases continue to occur even in countries with well-established vaccination pro-
grams’.65 The lingering of vaccine-preventable diseases in Europe can be attributed in
some part to vaccine scepticism—vaccines are very much victims of their own success
62 Jasanoff (n 43).
63 C-621/15 (n 11), para 53.
64 FE Andre, ‘Vaccination Greatly Reduces Disease, Disability, Death and Inequity Worldwide’ (2008) 86 (2)
Bull World Health Organ 81.
65 S Wicker and HC Maltezou, ‘Vaccine-preventable Diseases in Europe: Where Do We Stand?’ (2014) 14
(8) Expert Rev Vaccines 979.
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in Europe. As Plotkin argued, ‘In developed countries, we no longer have infectious
diseases for which there are vaccines, so the risk of the vaccine is perceived to be
greater than the risk of the disease. But that is true because the vaccine is being
used.’66 Nowhere is this vaccine scepticism more evident in Europe than France, the
source of this claim. As The State of Vaccine Conﬁdence 2016 survey recently at-
tested the European region that has the lowest conﬁdence in vaccine safety with
France having the least conﬁdent globally, with only with 41% of respondents in
France disagreeing with the statement that ‘vaccines are safe’ (compared to a global
average of 13%).67
Our concern is that the judgment in C-621/15 could contribute to this ongoing
scepticism in France and the rest of Europe, or even exacerbate it. Even though the
court did not ﬁnd expressly that the vaccine did cause the injury suffered by Mr W,
the judgment could be read as such, particularly in light of the fact that the court ap-
proved the granting of relief to the claimants acting on W’s behalf. This can be inter-
preted as the court agreeing with the argument advanced by Mr W (and his next of
kin) that the vaccine did cause the injury. Our concern regarding this grows when the
approval of relief is taken in conjunction with Paragraph 37 which reads: ‘notwith-
standing the evidence produced and the arguments put forward by the producer, a de-
fect in the product appears to be the most plausible explanation for the occurrence of
the damage, with the result that the defect and the causal link may reasonably be con-
sidered to be established’.68
We accept that the CJEU, when resolving such disputes, must be mindful of the
epistemological concerns of the legal process, such as applying rational procedures
and achieving ‘ﬁnality interests’ such as conserving resources and providing repose for
litigants, especially in sympathetic circumstances such as Mr W’s. However, we urge
the CJEU (and other institutions) to be mindful of how its decision-making can make
an impact beyond individual litigants in cases involving claims about defective vac-
cines. Through its decision in C-621/15 the CJEU is likely fuelling a myth: that the
beneﬁts of vaccines do not outweigh concerns about the harm they may cause.
Caution should be exercised because, as Midgley has argued, ‘myths do not alter
quickly or in a wholesale way. . .’.69 This is especially true where myths are attached
to prominent ideas,70 and, as the aforementioned data about vaccine scepticism sug-
gests, vaccine scepticism is a prominent idea. The CJEU—whose decisions inﬂuence
the legal frameworks of 28 Member States—should be mindful to not encourage the
entrenchment of such ideas without the scientiﬁc evidence base for doing so.
CONCLUSION
This Case Comment has examined the CJEU’s decision in C-621/15. The authors
have expressed three concerns about the CJEU’s approach to resolving this case. First,
that the CJEU improperly describes the scientiﬁc research as neither conﬁrming nor
66 HJ Larson and others, ‘The State of Vaccine Conﬁdence 2016: Global Insights through a 67-country
Survey’ (2016) 12 EBioMedicine 295.
67 ibid 297.
68 C-621/15 (n 11), para 37.
69 MMidgley, The Myths We Live By (1st edn, Routledge 2004) 6.
70 ibid.
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ruling out a causal relationship between the administration of the Hepatitis B vaccine
and the onset of MS. This is because the vast majority of scientiﬁc research has cre-
ated a dominant theory that there is no causal link. Secondly, that the court improp-
erly balances the competing scientiﬁc evidence produced in the case when it weighs
circumstantial evidence, and a small number of reported cases, as equal to this body
of scientiﬁc evidence thus allowing weak evidence to challenge the dominant theory.
Finally, that the CJEU’s approach generally feeds the growing vaccine scepticism in
the developed world, and especially in France where C-621/15 was referred from.
Ultimately, the authors argue that the CJEU’S decision is a compelling example of
the cultural conﬂicts that beset the institutions of law and science when they intersect
in the context of legal institutions addressing scientiﬁc uncertainty. The authors argue
that legal institutions, like the CJEU, when exercising their competence to address
questions conﬂicts in science, to be mindful to not exacerbate these tensions to the
detriment of ‘truth’.
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